Given a predicate P : {−1, 1} k → {−1, 1}, let CSP(P ) be the set of constraint satisfaction problems whose constraints are of the form P . We say that P is approximable if given a nearly satisfiable instance of CSP(P ), there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that does better than a random assignment. Otherwise, we say that P is approximation resistant.
Introduction
In constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs), we have a set of constraints and we want to satisfy as many of them as possible. Many fundamental problems in computer science are CSPs, including 3-SAT, MAX CUT, k-colorability, and unique games.
One fundamental question about CSPs is as follows. For a given type of CSP, is there a randomized polynomial time algorithm which is significantly better than randomly guessing an assignment? More precisely, letting r be the expected proportion of constraints satisfied by a random assignment, is there an ǫ > 0 and a randomized polynomial time algorithm A such that given a CSP instance where at least (1 − ǫ) of the constraints can be satisfied, A returns an x which satisfies at least (r + ǫ) of the constraints in expectation? If so, we say that this type of CSP is approximable. If not, then we say that this type of CSP is approximation resistant.
For example, Håstad's 3-bit PCP theorem [7] proves that 3-XOR instances (where every constraint is a linear equation modulo 2 over 3 variables) are NP-hard to approximate. A direct corollary of Håstad's 3-bit PCP theorem is that 3-SAT is also NP-hard to approximate and this theorem has served as the basis for numerous other inapproximability results. On the other hand, Goemans and Williamson's [4] breakthrough algorithm for MAX CUT, which gives an approximation ratio of .878 for MAX CUT, shows that MAX CUT is approximable as a random cut would only cut half of the edges in expectation.
However, while the approximability or approximation resistance of CSPs has been extensively investigated, there is still much that is unknown. In this paper, we investigate CSPs where every constraint has the form of some fixed presidential-type predicate P . We show that for almost all presidential-type predicates P , this type of CSP is approximable.
Our Result
In this paper, we prove the following result. Theorem 1.8. For any δ 0 > 0, there exists a k 0 ∈ N such that if k ≥ k 0 , δ ∈ (δ 0 , 1 − 2/k], and δk + k − 1 is an odd integer then the presidential-type predicate P (x) = sign δkx 1 + k i=2 x i is approximable. Remark 1.9. If δ > 1 − 2/k and δk + k − 1 is an odd integer, then δk ≥ k. This means that the predicate becomes a dictator predicate, which is trivially approximable and not very interesting.
Relationship to Prior Work
We now describe known criteria for determining whether a predicate P is approximable or approximation resistant and how our techniques compare to these criteria.
In 2008, Raghavendra [10] gave a characterization of which predicates are approximable and which predicates are approximation resistant. Raghavendra showed that either a standard semidefinite program (SDP) together with an appropriate rounding scheme gives a better approximation ratio than a random assignment or it is unique games hard to do so (see section 2.2). However, this characterization leaves much to be desired because for a given predicate, it can be extremely hard to tell which case holds. In fact, it is not even known to be decidable! Khot, Tulsiani, and Worah [8] gave a characterization of which predicates are weakly approximable which is based on whether there exist certain vanishing measures over a polytope which we call the KTW polytope. Unfortunately, it is also unknown whether this characterization is decidable.
Thus, if we want to determine if a given predicate P is approximable or approximation resistant, it is often better to use more direct criteria. For showing that predicates are hard to approximate, the following criterion, proved by Austrin and Mossel [2] , is extremely useful. Definition 1.10. We say that a predicate P has a balanced pairwise independent distribution of solutions if there exists a distribution D on {−1, 1} k such that 1. D is supported on {x ∈ {−1, 1} k : P (x) = 1} (D is a distribution of solutions to P ) 2. For all i ∈ [k], E x∈D [x i ] = 0 and for all i < j ∈ [k], E x∈D [x i x j ] = 0 Theorem 1.11. If P has a balanced pairwise independent distribution of solutions then P is unique games hard to approximate.
This criterion captures most but not all predicates which are known to be unique games hard to approximate. One example of a predicate which is not captured by this criterion is the predicate which was recently constructed by Potechin [9] which is unique games hard to approximate and is a balanced linear threshold function. 1 For approximation resistance which does not rely on the hardness of unique games, Chan [3] gave the following stricter criterion which implies NP-hardness of approximation.
1 There were previously known predicates, such as the GLST predicate [5] P (x1, x2, x3, x4) = 1+x 1 2
x2x4, which are unique games hard (in fact NP-hard) to approximate yet do not have a balanced pairwise independent distribution of solutions. However, the hardness of these predicates can be reduced to the hardness of predicates which do have a balanced pairwise independent distribution of solutions, so Austrin and Mossel's criterion can still be used for these predicates. Theorem 1.12. If a predicate P has a balanced pairwise independent subgroup of solutions then P is NP-hard to approximate.
For showing that predicates are approximable, the general technique is as follows:
1. Run Raghavendra's SDP to obtain biases {b i : i ∈ [n]} and pairwise biases {b ij : i < j ∈ [n]} for the variables 2. Construct a rounding scheme which takes these biases and pairwise biases and gives us a solution x such that if the SDP "thinks" that almost all of the constraints are satisfiable then x satisfies significantly more constraints than a random assignment in expectation.
Based on rounding schemes which are essentially linear in the biases and pairwise biases, Hast [6] obtained the following criterion for when predicates are approximable: Theorem 1.13 (Hast's criterion). Given a predicate P : {−1, +1} k → {−1, +1},
If there are constants c 1 , c 2 such that c 2 ≥ 0 and c 1 P 1 (x) + c 2 P 2 (x) > 0 for all x such that P (x) = 1 then P is approximable.
Aside from Hast's criterion, most of the known approximability results are ad-hoc. Some such results are as follows.
1. Austrin, Benabbas, and Magen [1] showed that the monarchy predicate P (
is approximable and that any predicate P which is a balanced symmetric quadratic threshold function is approximable.
2. Potechin [9] showed that the almost monarchy predicate P (x 1 , · · · , x k ) = sign((k − 4)x 1 + k i=2 x i ) is approximable for sufficiently large k.
In this paper, we prove that almost all presidential-type predicates are approximable by generalizing the ideas Potechin [9] used to prove that the almost monarchy predicate is approximable for sufficiently large k and making these ideas more systematic. Our work compares to previous criteria as follows.
1. Raghavendra's criterion and the KTW criterion give a space of rounding schemes which should be considered but don't provide an efficient way to search for the best rounding scheme in this space. For our techniques, we take full advantage of this space of rounding schemes while also providing a way to systematically construct the rounding scheme which we need.
2. Like Hast's criterion, we need to check that a certain expression is positive for all x such that P (x) = 1. However, there are two key differences between our techniques and Hast's criterion. First, as noted above, we use a larger space of rounding schemes. In particular, we use rounding schemes which are very much non-linear in the biases and pairwise biases. Second, because these rounding schemes are nonlinear in the biases and pairwise biases, it is actually not quite enough to check all x such that P (x) = 1. Instead, we need to check over the entire KTW polytope.
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some techniques that are crucial in our proof.
Fourier Analysis
In this paper, we will make extensive use of the Fourier expansion of boolean predicates. The Fourier expansion of a boolean predicate f is of the following form
where x I = i∈I x i and {f I :
We have the following lemma for the Fourier coefficients, the proof of which can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 2.1 (Fourier coefficients of presidential type predicates). Let f (x 1 , . . . , x k ) = sign(a · x 1 + x 2 + · · · + x k ) be a presidential type predicate where a ≤ k − 2 and a + k − 1 is an odd integer. Let f tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens (indices from 2 to k) andf P +tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens together with the president (index 1). Let τ = ⌊(k−a−1)/2⌋. We have
The Standard SDP for CSPs
In this subsection we briefly describe Raghavendra's SDP [10] , which together with an appropriate rounding scheme approximates a given CSP in polynomial time as long as the CSP is not unique games hard to approximate. Note that Raghavendra [10] considered CSPs for general constraints but for our discussion here we will focus only on boolean predicates. Before that, we first define the KTW polytope, which plays a crucial role in Khot, Tulsiani and Worah's [8] characterization of which predicates are weakly approximable.
where f : {−1, 1} k → {−1, 1} is a boolean predicate and CH(S) is the convex hull of S.
Given a CSP instance on n variables x 1 , . . . , x n and m constraints C 1 , . . . , C m , the SDP searches for biases {b i } and pairwise biases {b ij } whose intended meanings are
Then, for each constraint C i , it searches for a local distribution on the variables in C i which agrees with the global biases and pairwise biases and maximizes the probability that C i is satisfied. The goal of the SDP is to find global biases and pairwise biases such that the sum of these satisfying probabilities is maximized.
Let
For a polytope A and a real number r, define rA = {rx | x ∈ A}. We take the following formal definition of the SDP from [9] . Definition 2.3. Let Φ be a CSP instance on n variables x 1 , . . . , x n and m constraints C 1 , . . . , C m . The standard SDP for Φ has the following variables.
•
• b i for each variable x i and b ij for each pair of variables x i , x j where i < j.
Let B is the square matrix indexed by {0, 1, . . . , n} such that
• B ii = 1 for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
• B 0i = B i0 = b i for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• B ij = B ji = b ij for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that i < j.
The SDP maximizes m i=1 a C i subject to the following constraints: 1. B 0.
For every constraint
Raghavendra showed in [10] that if for all ǫ > 0, this SDP fails to distinguish instances of CSP(P ) where (1 − ǫ) fraction of the constraints are satisfiable from instances of CSP(P ) where at most (r P +ǫ) fraction of the constraints are satisfiable, then P is unique games hard to approximate. Conversely, if this SDP does distinguish between these two cases for some ǫ > 0 then P can be approximated by this SDP followed by a rounding scheme. Thus, assuming the unique games conjecture (or at least that unique games is hard), if a predicate is approximable then it can be approximated by running this SDP followed by a rounding scheme.
Approximation Algorithms for Predicates
To approximate a given instance Φ ∈ CSP(P ) where P is a presidential type predicate, the first step of our approximation algorithm is running the standard SDP to obtain biases {b i } and pairwise biases {b ij }. We then probabilistically choose values for x i according to these biases. Our goal is to have
where ǫ > 0 is a constant depending only on P .
To achieve this goal, we will choose the expected value E[x I ] of each monomial x I . However, we do not have complete freedom for these choices. Intuitively, E[x I ] should obey the following constraints:
1. E[x I ] is a function of {b i | i ∈ I} and {b ij | i, j ∈ I}. It turns out that for determining whether a predicate P is weakly approximable (which is the same as approximable for presidential-type predicates), these are the only constraints on E[x I ]. More precisely, we have the following theorem from [9] , which is also implicit in [8] 
E[x

For all permutations
σ ∈ S a , f a (b i σ(1) , . . . , b i σ(a) , b i σ(1) i σ(2) , . . . , b i σ(a−1) i σ(a) ) = f a (b i 1 , . . . , b ia , b i 1 i 2 , . . . , b i a−1 ia ).
For all signs
Then there exists a sequence of rounding schemes {R q } and coefficients {c q } such that for all subsets
where E Rq [x I ] is the expected value of x I given by rounding scheme R q . Moreover, this sum can be taken to be globally convergent.
Remark 2.5. This theorem gives us a linear combination of rounding schemes. The coefficients c q can be thought of as a probability distribution of rounding schemes, but there are two problems:
• q |c q | may not be 1. One fix to this issue is to scale f by an appropriate constant ǫ.
• c q may be negative. In general, this can be a real issue but here the predicates we consider are odd, which means if c q is negative we can simply flip the rounding scheme and take it with probability −c q .
Example 2.6. This theorem says the following about E[
• We can take E[
The first equality corresponds to exchanging i and j while the second equality corresponds to flipping x i .
Example 2.7. Some examples of possible functions f 3 are as follows:
As discussed in the following subsections, we will take E[
3. Potechin [9] found a simpler rounding scheme for the monarchy predicate where
Sums of Products of Biases and Pairwise Biases
In this subsection, we define some notations related to biases and pairwise biases. Note that similar definitions were also used in [9] .
Intuitively, S H is the sum of products B E 1 ,E 2 where E 1 ∪ E 2 has the form H. One particularly important such sum in our algorithms is S {{i 1 ,i 2 }} , which is the sum of pairwise biases with indices in [2, k] .
Definition 2.11. We define S {{i 1 ,i 2 }} = E(1+∆) where E is a quantity depending on the predicate.
Remark 2.12. The value of E is taken to be the average of S (i 1 ,i 2 ) in the cases where the vote passes with value 1. These cases are intuitively the most difficult cases to round because the contribution of linear term is too small. For the predicates in our discussion, we always have E = Θ(k 2 ). Definition 2.13. We define the following shorthand notations for some important sums.
Example 2.14. In the case where k = 4, l = 1, we have
where the hidden constants in big-O may depend on l.
The proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix.
Our Technique
Our technique is a generalization of the technique from [9] . As we discussed earlier, our goal is to have
for every given point in the KTW polytope.
The contribution of degree 1 terms in I⊆[k]f I E[X I ] is some multiple off P α +f C β. For the two kinds of presidential type predicates that we consider, it holds thatf P is exponentially larger then f C . So if we want to use the above inequality to get a positive value, we need more β from higher degree terms. By Theorem 2.4, for l ≥ 1, our rounding scheme can let the term
where c 2l+1 is a value that we have the freedom to choose. If we sum up the contribution from degree 2l + 1 terms, we get
We will choose a function h(t) = m i=1 a i t i , which we call a rounding polynomial, and appropriate constants c 2l+1 such that m l=1 |I|=2l+1f
We will choose h to be very close to 1 so that this approximately gives β. Together with the degree 1 terms, this will give a positive value for E[f ]. However, we have limited freedom in choosing the polynomial h. Since h has no constant term, we must have h(0) = 0. We also need h(1) = 1 and h ′ (1) = h ′′ (1) = 0. This is because the cases where ∆ is closed to 0 are the most difficult to round, and we need the contribution to be as close to β as possible. For approximating other presidential-type predicates, we will need h to remain close to 1 for a wider range of ∆ (but not for ∆ < −1). To achieve this, we control the growth of h by introducing an exponential factor, i.e., letting h(1 + ∆) = 1 + ∆ 3 exp(−B(1 + ∆)) for some constant B. We then truncate the Taylor expansion of this function to get a rounding polynomial.
Warm-up: Quasi-monarchy Predicates
As a warm-up, we show that quasi-monarchy predicates are approximable by applying our techniques in Section 2.5. Definition 3.1. A quasi-monarchy predicate is a presidential type predicate of the form
where c is a positive integer.
Remark 3.2. Some special cases of quasi-monarchy predicates have been studied before. When c = 1, we have the monarchy predicate which has been studied in [1] and [9] . When c = 2, we have the almost monarchy predicate which has been studied in [9] .
In this section, we prove the following theorem. Theorem 3.3. For every positive integer c, the quasi-monarchy predicate
is approximable if k is sufficiently large.
Note that Theorem 3.3 follows from Theorem 1.8 by setting δ = 1−2c/k. We prove this theorem as a special case because it's a nice illustration of our techniques, and the rounding polynomial used in this case is much simpler than the one used in Theorem 1.8.
Fourier Coefficients
We first calculate the Fourier coefficients. The following is a corollary from Lemma 2.1.
where c > 0 is a constant integer. Letf tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens andf P +tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens together with the president. We havê
, t is an odd constant
It follows from Lemma 2.1 that
We need to estimate the term
Note that t here is a constant independent of k, so the term
When i < c − 2, we have
and the lemma follows.
Note thatf P is exponentially larger thanf C .
Choosing the Rounding Scheme
As discussed in Remark 2.12, we take E to be the average of S {{i 1 ,i 2 }} in the two cases where
In the case where x 1 = 1, we have that c citizens also vote 1, so
In the case where
Consider the following rounding scheme, which is the same as that used in [9] for the almost monarchy predicate.
1. After rounding, x i will have bias
2. After rounding, x i 1 x i 2 x i 3 will have bias
We prove Theorem 3.3 by showing that this rounding scheme achieves a positive value. Let h be the following rounding polynomial:
It is easy to verify that h(1 + ∆) = 1 + ∆ 3 . The coefficients in our rounding scheme are chosen to match this polynomial. As mentioned in Remark 2.5, we have a factor of ǫ in our coefficients because of some technicality issues, and we will ignore it in the following analysis.
Evaluating the Rounding Scheme
We calculate the contribution of terms by their degrees as follows (recall the definitions of S 1,l , S 2,l , S 3,l from Definition 2.13).
• Degree 3 terms. Their contribution is
• Degree 5 terms. We can similarly compute that their contribution is
• Degree 7 terms. We can similarly compute that their contribution is
Summing these contributions up, we get
Here we used the fact that the terms
are O(1) and h ′ (1) = h ′′ (1) = 0. Now we add in the contribution from the degree 1 terms, which is (k − (c − 1)(c/2 + 1))(k − 2c)
We know from Lemma 3.4 thatf P is exponentially larger thanf C . This means that we can assume that we are adding in a multiple of α and ignore the multiple of β which is exponentially smaller. Suppose we add in (k − (c − 1)(c/2 + 1))(k − 2c)α, then we will get
To show that the above quantity is positive, we need the following lemma, which we will prove at the end of this section. Lemma 3.6. For sufficiently large k we have
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We have two cases.
• ∆ ≥ −0.55. Then ∆ 2 ≤ 0.3025. Applying Lemma 3.6, we have that the value of our rounding scheme is
Since ∆ 2 < 1/3, we have
Also, if we let k be sufficiently large, then the O(k) term will be dominated by the preceding k 2 term, which means the value of our rounding scheme will be positive.
• ∆ < −0.55, then we know that α is positive 2 and we can write the dominating terms of the value in our rounding scheme as
The second term is positive and is Ω(k 2 ). The first term is non-negative when ∆ ≥ −1. If ∆ < −1, since ∆ > −1− O(1/k), we know that 1+ ∆ 3 is on the order of O(1/k), which means that even if the first term could be negative, it is dominated by the second term. Either way, the O(k)|∆| + O(1) term will be dominated. So if k is set to be a sufficiently large number, we will get a positive value.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Since ∆ is a convex function on the KTW polytope, it suffices to check that for each satisfying assignment (k − 2c)α + β ≥ (k−4c)|∆| 3
. Let t be the number of ones in x 2 , . . . , x k , then we have β = t − (k − 1 − t) = 2t − k + 1 and
which implies that
, we have
To establish our lemma, we will show that
We have two cases, x 1 = 1 or
which means t ≥ c (at least c citizens vote 1). The inequality becomes
which is equivalent to
The left hand side of the above inequality is a quadratic function on t where c ≤ t ≤ k − 1.
To check it's non-positive, we check its values when t = c and t = k − 1. When t = c, the value of LHS is 2c−1 k−1 − 2, which is negative when k is sufficiently large. When t = k − 1, its value is −3(k − 1) −
which is in turn equivalent to
Again, we check whether LHS is non-positive when t = k − c and t = k − 1. When t = k − c, LHS is equal to
. We again have two cases on x 1 . If x 1 = 1, then the inequality becomes
The left hand side is a quadratic function that achieves its minimum when t is negative, so we simply need to check its value at t = c, which is
The left hand side is again a quadratic function that achieves its minimum when t is negative. We check its value at t = k − c, which is
This completes our proof.
Proof of Theorem 1.8
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.8.
and δk + k − 1 is an odd integer then the presidential-type predicate
is approximable.
Evaluating the Rounding Scheme
In this subsection, we evaluate how well our rounding scheme will do with a given polynomial h. We will then use this to choose the polynomial h in the next subsection. We have the following lemma for Fourier coefficients, the proof of which can be found in the appendix. Letf tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens andf P +tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens together with the president. We havê
where the constants inside the big Os depend on t but not on δ.
Remark 4.2. Since the constants inside the big Os do not depend on δ, we can allow δ to depend on k as long as δ ∈ (0, 1). In particular, we can take δ = 1 − 2c k for any constant c ≥ 1. We need to choose the value of E (recall that S {{i 1 ,i 2 }} = E(1 + ∆)). The two most difficult cases to round (where δkα + b = 1) are the following.
• The president and 1−δ 2 k citizens vote 1, others vote −1. In this case 2≤i<j x i x j = (1−δ) 2 2
• The president and 1+δ 2 k citizens vote −1, others vote 1. In this case 2≤i<j x i x j = (1+δ) 2 2
Taking the average of these two cases we have E = δ 2 k 2 2 − k 2 + 1. Since δ > δ 0 is at least a constant, we have E = Ω(k 2 ).
As before, we will choose a rounding polynomial h for our rounding scheme. For this proof, we will analyze the value of our rounding scheme in terms of h and defer the choice of h till later.
Assume that we have h(x) = m l=1 a l x l and coefficients
for degree 2l + 1 terms in our rounding scheme. The contribution of degree ≥ 3 terms is m l=1 |I|=2l+1f
We will choose h such that h ′ (1) = h ′′ (1) = 0, so the above becomes
Now we add in the contribution of degree 1 terms. Again, sincef P is exponentially larger than f C , we can safely assume that the contribution of degree 1 terms is a multiple of α. Suppose we add (δk 2 + k/δ)α, we get
Choosing the Rounding Polynomial
We need to show that, by choosing h appropriately, ( * ) is positive when k is sufficiently large. We first show that h(x) = 1 − (1 − x) 3 exp(−Bx) works for some constant B. However, the problem with this function is that it's not a polynomial. We will then show that by truncating the Taylor expansion of this function we can get a polynomial which also works. 
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.6. Since ∆ is a convex function on the KTW polytope, it suffices to check that for each satisfying assignment, δkα + β ≥ δk|∆| 4 + 1 2 . Letting t be the number of ones in x 2 , . . . , x k , we have that β = t − (k − 1 − t) = 2t − k + 1 and
We will show that δkα + β ≥
, from which our lemma will follow. To this end, we show that δkα + β ≥
• δkα + β ≥
The left hand side is a quadratic function on t with positive leading coefficient, and to check it's non-positive we simply need to check its values on t = 1−δ and when t = k − 1,
. We again have two cases, α = 1 or α = −1. If α = 1, we have δkα + β = δk + 2t − k + 1 and the inequality becomes
The left hand side is a quadratic function that achieves minimum when t is negative, so we simply need the inequality to hold when t = 1−δ 2 k, at which point the value of LHS is 1−δ 2 ≥ 0. If α = −1, the inequality becomes
Again, we simply need it to hold when t = This completes our proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Note that the range of ∆ is approximately
We have the following cases.
• ∆ ≥ −0.55. In this case we have
The last inequality is due to Lemma 4.4. Here the two quadratic terms are δ 2 k 2 |∆|/4 (note that δ > δ 0 is at least a constant) and kβ(h(1 + ∆) − 1). To show that the above is positive when k is sufficiently large, it suffices to show that • ∆ < −0.55. In this case, by the same reasoning as in Theorem 3.3, we have α > 0. We can write ( * ) as
If ∆ > −1, then both the first two terms are positive and Ω(k 2 ). If ∆ ≤ −1, since ∆ ≥ −1 − O(1/k), we know that the first term is O(k), the second term is Ω(k 2 ) and positive. Either way, we get a positive value when k is sufficiently large. 
The difference of ( * ) between h = h 1 and h = h 2 is
We have the same two cases as in Lemma 4.3.
• ∆ < −0.55. In this case, the same argument from Lemma 4.3 applies as well.
• ∆ ≥ 0.55. Note that in the previous proof of this case, we not only showed that ( * ) is positive, we also showed that the k 2 |∆| term has a positive coefficient. This means we can choose η to be small enough such that
is dominated by the previous k 2 |∆| term. So we will end up with a positive value again.
By Lemma 4.5, if we choose h 2 as the rounding polynomial, our rounding scheme will have a positive expected value. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.8.
Conclusions
In this paper, we showed that almost all presidential type predicates are approximable. To do this, we observed that if P is a presidential type predicate then P = sign(l) where l is a balanced linear form. We then used high degree rounding schemes to approximate l over the entire KTW polytope.
This work raises a number of open questions, including the following: 
A Missing Proofs from Section 2
Lemma 2.1 (Restated). Let f (x 1 , . . . , x k ) = sign(a · x 1 + x 2 + · · · + x k ) be a presidential type predicate where a ≤ k − 2 and a + k − 1 is an odd integer. Letf tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens (indices from 2 to k) andf P +tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens together with the president (index 1). Let τ = ⌊(k − a − 1)/2⌋. We have
Proof of Lemma 2.1.
(1) We havef
We first choose how citizens vote. Note that if the vote is already determined by the citizens, then the contribution to the sum is 0. Suppose that at most τ = ⌊(k − a − 1)/2⌋ citizens vote 1. Then, even if the president also votes 1, we have
So no matter how the president votes, we always have f (x) = −1. Similarly, if at most τ citizens vote −1, then no matter how the president votes we always have f (x) = 1. These two cases contribute 0 to the sum. In the remaining scenarios, the vote of president determines the result, i.e., f (x) = x 1 . This case contributes 1 − 2 ·
(2) Let I be a set of t citizens where t is an odd integer. By symmetry we havê
We analyze the sum as follows.
• x 1 = 1. Assume that i citizens from {2, 3, . . . , k}−I vote 1. If i > τ , then the result is 1 no matter how people in I vote, which means the contribution is 0. Now assume i ≤ τ . Let j be the number of citizens from I that vote 1. Note that f (x) = 1 if and only if i + j > τ , so we have
The contribution in this case is
The equality comes from the fact that t j=0 t j (−1) j = (1 − 1) t = 0.
• x 1 = −1. This case is symmetric. Note that since f and x I are both odd, we have f (x)x I = f (−x)(−x) I . So the contribution of this case is also 2
Summing these contributions up, we obtainf tC =
The analysis in this case is almost similar to that in item (2) . Let I be a set of the president along with t citizens where t is an even integer. We havê
• x 1 = 1. Again assume that i citizens from {2, 3, . . . , k} − I vote 1. If i > τ , then the contribution is 0. Now assume i ≤ τ . Let j be the number of citizens from I that vote 1. This time we have f (x)
• x 1 = −1. Similarly, the contribution of this case is also −2
Summing these contributions up, we havef P +tC = −
Proof of Proposition 2.15. Here we only prove the first equality since the other two can be proved similarly. Recall that S {{i 1 ,i 2 }} = E(1 + ∆) and E = Θ(k 2 ). The first equality is equivalent to
Let's analyze the term β(S {{i 1 ,i 2 }} ) l , by definition, it's equal to
Let's call the sum on the right hand side T . We classify the terms in T according to number of repetitions in indices. If there is no repetition, then the term
Note that in S 1,l the order of the l pairwise biases can be arbitrary, so the sum of terms with no repeated indices is equal to l!S 1,l . If there are two or more repetitions, then the number of distinct indices is at most 2l − 1, and the contribution of such terms is O(k 2l−1 ). If there is exact one repetition, then there are two cases.
• j 1 is equal to some j t for t ≥ 2. Without loss of generality consider the terms where the only repetition is j 1 = j 2 or j 1 = j 3 (note that j 2 < j 3 ). The contribution of these terms are
This is because the terms where j 2 , j 3 , . . . , j 2l+1 are not distinct have at most 2l − 1 distinct indices and contribute O(k 2l−1 ). So the contribution of this case is
• j s = j t for some s, t ≥ 2. Note that in this case s and t cannot appear in the same pairwise bias. Without loss of generality assume s ∈ {2, 3} and t ∈ {4, 5}. We have We conclude that β(S {{i 1 ,i 2 }} ) l = l!S 1,l + lS {i 1 ,{i 1 ,i 2 }} (S {{i 1 ,i 2 }} ) l−1 + βS {{i 1 ,i 2 },{i 1 ,i 3 }} l(l − 1)(S {{i 1 ,i 2 }} ) l−2 + O k 2l−1 .
We get the desired equality by shifting the terms.
B Proof of Lemma 4.1
We first prove some combinatorial identities to be used later.
Proposition B.1. For t, l ∈ N, we have Note that degree t−2 term is formed by taking one l in one of the factors in Hence, the lemma follows.
C Converting Non-integer Coefficient to Integer Coefficient
In this section, we show that the assumption that the coefficient of the president is integer is not a serious restriction by proving the following theorem.
Lemma C.1. Let δ be a constant with 0 < δ < 1. There exists a function δ ′ = δ ′ (k) such that δ ′ · k ∈ N and
for every k ∈ N and x ∈ {−1, 1} k .
Proof. If δk is already an integer, then let δ ′ (k) = δ. Otherwise, there exists m ∈ N such that δk ∈ (m, m + 1). We will choose δ ′ (k) = m/k or (m + 1)/k depending on the following: if k − 1 is even, we choose δ ′ (k) · k to be odd, and if k − 1 is odd, we choose δ ′ (k) · k to be even. Note that the range of
By our choice of δ ′ , every t ∈ R is odd and therefore |t| ≥ 1. For every x ∈ {−1, 1} k , we have
What we essentially did here is that we rounded δk to either below or above. Note that this gives |δ ′ (k) − δ| ≤ 1/k, which means when k is sufficiently large, δ ′ and δ will be very close to each other.
